Professor Amit Bubna’s research primarily focuses on financing issues and financial institutions, both formal and informal. He has written research papers on topics ranging from microfinance, to venture capital in the US and to initial public offerings (IPOs) in the Indian capital markets. Prior to ISB, he was a Senior Managing Economist at LECG, a leading economic consulting firm in the US. While at LECG, he worked on a number of antitrust and financial damages cases. In addition, he was also a consultant to many companies participating in several FCC telecom spectrum auctions. His teaching interests include both economics and finance courses.
MA (Economics), University of Cambridge, 1999
Ph D (Economics), Stanford University, 1998
BA (Economics), Cambridge University, 1992
BSc (Economics), Presidency College, 1990
Bubna, Amit., Prabhala, N R. (2011) "IPOs With and Without Allocation Discretion: Empirical Evidence", Journal of Financial Intermediation, 20, 530-561Read Abstract >Close >
Book building is the dominant offering mechanism for IPOs in the U.S. and other markets. It is controversial, in large part because it gives underwriters extensive power over IPO allocations. Critics argue that allocations could be abused to generate kickbacks for underwriters while proponents hold that allocation power could improve pre-market
price discovery. We examine the effect of varying underwriter power over IPO allocations in the Indian IPO market, exploiting natural variation induced by market regulations. When underwriters control allocations, book building is associated with lesser under-pricing, but this effect quickly dissipates when regulations withdraw allocation powers. Using proprietary data sets on IPO books, we examine how underwriters use allocation powers. We find that allocation discrimination is pervasive, economically significant, and is used to differentiate between institutional bidders based on the size of the bid as well as non-bid information such as the type of the bidder and other soft information possessed by IPO managers. Our evidence supports book building theories in which giving underwriters allocation powers assists in pre-market price discovery.
Financial intermediaries worldwide are seeking mechanisms for participating in micro lending. Using informed “local capitalists” as bank’s on-lenders fails due to borrowers’ incentive to
default with multiple credit sources. A coalition of local capitalists may not resolve the problem in the presence of a monopoly moneylender with superior skills in lending and enforcement. A credible competitive threat to the moneylender can only arise if the local capitalist coalition also provides information sharing benefits that lower their cost of lending vis-`a-vis the moneylender. Franchising allows local capitalists to form such a coalition.We analyze conditions under which welfare-enhancing franchising would obtain.
Bubna, Amit. (2002) "Syndication Among Venture Capitalists: When and With Whom", Research in Finance, 19, 285-321
Books and Monographs
Bubna, Amit., Gangopadhyay, Shubhashis. "Economics of Competition Law" in Vinod Dhall (ed.), "Competition Law Today: Concepts, Issues and the Law in Practice", Oxford University Press, 2007
Investing in Private Equity
Bubna, Amit (2004) "Small Depositors, Tread With Caution", Financial Express, August 07, 2004