Conference Proceedings

The ISB has a vibrant research ecosystem owing to the multitude of conferences hosted by different academic areas and Centres of Excellence (CoEs). Dedicated to a three-part agenda – knowledge creation, knowledge dissemination and knowledge to action – the CoEs at the ISB are at the forefront of their chosen research areas. The Centres and academic areas facilitate and advance both basic and applied research by faculty at the ISB by organising both scholarly and industry focussed conferences. The learning from these events is captured in the form of conference proceedings for the participants and other learning enthusiasts.

Conference ProceedingsGang K, Dixit, Jaya. "Impact of Korean Market Reforms on Firm Innovation", Academy of International Business Proceedings, 2014
Conference ProceedingsPereira, Arun., , Shouvik Dhar. "The Engaged Classroom: A Successful Lead User Innovation", Proceedings of the 8th International Technology, Education, and Development Conference (INTED) Valencia, Spain, March 10-12,2014, Valencia, Spain, 2014Read Abstract >Close >This paper draws on the concept of “lead users” to illustrate the development of an innovative technology platform for interactive learning inside the classroom and the management of content and delivery outside the classroom. The lead user method for innovative products and services was first introduced by Eric von Hippel (e.g. [1], [2]); it offers an unique approach to breakthrough products and services by collecting information on market needs and solutions from “lead user” customers. The lead user solution discussed in this paper is a technology platform that handles the entire learning cycle by unifying secured, effective content delivery, tracking activities of learners and enhancing teacher-student engagement in the classroom. Keywords: Lead User, active learning, flipped classroom.

Conference ProceedingsShrimali, Gireesh.,Akella, Aditya.,Mutapcic, Almir. "Cooperative Interdomain Traffic Engineering using Nash Bargaining and Decomposition", Proceedings of IEEE Infocom, Minneapolis, MA, ForthcomingRead Abstract >Close >We present a new inter-domain traffic engineering protocol based on the concepts of {\em Nash bargaining} and {\em dual decomposition}. Under this scheme, ISPs use an iterative procedure to jointly optimize a social cost function, referred to as the Nash product. We show that the global optimization problem can be separated into sub-problems by introducing appropriate shadow prices on the inter-domain flows. These sub-problems can then be solved independently and in a decentralized manner by the individual ISPs. Our approach does not require the ISPs to share any sensitive internal information (such as network topology or link weights). More importantly, our approach is {\em provably Pareto-efficient and fair}. Therefore, we believe that our approach is highly amenable to adoption by ISPs when compared to past naive approaches. We conduct simulation studies of our approach over several real ISP topologies. Our evaluation shows that the approach converges quickly, offers equitable performance improvements to ISPs, is significantly better than unilateral approaches (e.g. hot potato routing) and offers the same performance as a centralized solution with full knowledge.

Conference ProceedingsShrimali, Gireesh.,Kumar, Sunil. "Paid Peering among Internet Service Providers", Association for Computing Machinery, Minneapolis, MA, ForthcomingRead Abstract >Close >We develop models for Internet Service Provider (ISP) peering when ISPs charge each other for carrying traffic. We study linear pricing schemes in a simple ISP peering model using a two stage sequential Nash game in which self interested providers first set linear prices for carrying peers' traffic and then choose to route their traffic according to the prices set and costs incurred by carrying traffic on their links. Under reasonable cost models, we show that rational ISPs will participate in this game. Moreover, we show that the ISP with the lower marginal cost in the absence of peering has no incentive to send traffic in a hot-potato fashion and effectively acts as a monopolist. The other provider strategically routes traffic, splitting between hot-potato and cold-potato routing. We also show that though this outcome is inefficient, both ISPs are strictly better off when compared to not peering at all. Finally, we consider appropriate cost models that make the notion of capacity explicit. Under certain conditions we show not only that the monopolist has an incentive to upgrade the capacity of its links but also that this incentive is higher when the monopolist is in a peering relationship.

Conference Proceedings. "Borrowing Culture and Debt Relief: Evidence from a Policy Experiment", Indonesia, 2013
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