- In The Media
Professor Sanjay Kallapur teaches Valuation and Financial Accounting. Prior to joining the ISB, he was a tenured Associate Professor at the Krannert School of Management, Purdue University. He has also taught at the University of Arizona, University of California at Irvine, the Hong Kong University of Science & Technology, and National University of Singapore.
This study provides evidence on whether auditor independence-in-appearance, proxied by earnings response coefficients, is related to the non-audit fee ratio (non-audit to total fees from a client) or client importance (total fees from a client as a percentage of the total revenues of the audit firm). The results from large samples over the period 2001 to 2006 show, contrary to popular belief and the findings of some prior studies, that there is no evidence of a relation between perceived auditor independence and the non-audit fee ratio. However, perceived auditor independence is negatively associated with client importance, consistent with the economic theory of auditing. Our paper adds to the literature by examining the relative importance of non-audit fee ratios and client importance as determinants of independence-in-appearance.
This study tests an implication of the real-options theory of investment, that uncertainty leads firms to prefer technologies with low fixed and high variable costs. In 1983, a change in Medicare reimbursement increased the uncertainty of revenues for hospitals. Using a sample of 831 departments in 59 Washington State hospitals over the 19771994 period, we find that the ratio of variable to total costs increased after 1983. This increase is not attributable to a gradual increase in the ratio over time: We estimate a significant increase after 1983 even after controlling for a time trend. Further, we find a greater increase in the variable-to-total cost ratio for hospitals that had higher percentages of Medicare patients, increasing our confidence in the conclusion that the change in cost behavior is attributable to Medicare`s change in reimbursement.
We find that brand assets recognized by 33 U.K. firms are value relevant, i.e., associated with market values. Most previous studies on the value relevance of intangible assets have examined outsiders' valuations; our study adds to the literature by showing the relevance of managers' valuations of recognized intangible assets despite their contracting incentives to overvalue brands. Contracting incentives are likely to be strong in our study because brand assets are a substantial fraction of net assets: the median firm's brand assets are 44.2 percent of book value of equity (including brands).
However, we find that the market capitalization rates of brands of firms with low contracting incentives are higher than those of firms with high contracting incentives to capitalize and overstate brand values. We base our measures of contracting incentives on previous studies' findings that brand recognition helped firms (1) avoid London Stock Exchange (LSE) rules requiring shareholder approval for large acquisition or disposal transactions and (2) reduce their leverage. We thus partition our sample into subsamples according to (1) whether or not brand capitalization allowed the firm to avoid the LSE rule for at least one acquisition or disposal transaction, and (2) whether the firm's industry-adjusted debt-to-book-equity ratio was above or below the median. The difference in market capitalization rates indicates that there could be substantial differences in the extent of bias or error in brand valuations of firms with different levels of contracting incentives, i.e., brand asset measures might not be reliable.
The stock price reaction during the 21 days surrounding the first announcement of brand recognition is significantly positively associated with the recognized brand amount. The market reaction could be attributed to either the benefits of relaxing contracting constraints, or the correction of previous market undervaluation of brand-intensive firms prior to brand capitalization.
The economic theory of auditor independence (DeAngelo 1981b) suggests that auditors' incentives to compromise their independence are related to client importance. Using ratios of client fees and of nonaudit fees divided by the audit firm's U.S. revenues or a surrogate for the audit-practice-office revenues as measures of client importance, we investigate their association with Jones-model abnormal accruals. In a sample of 1,871 clients of Big 5 audit firms we do not find a statistically significant association between abnormal accruals and any of the client importance measures. Our theory development also suggests that auditor incentives to compromise independence should increase with the extent of client opportunities and incentives to manage earnings, and decrease with the strength of corporate governance and auditor expertise. We also do not find a statistically significant association between abnormal accruals and client importance in subsets of the samples partitioned by proxies for these factors.
Explains the concept of the investment set (IOS: i.e. chances to invest for expansion, new products, cost reduction etc.) and its effects on firm value. Reviews previous research on the theoretical relationships between IOS and optimal contracting resulting from shareholder/debtholder conflict, agency costs and performance measurement problems; and empirical research on its links with company policy on financing, dividends and compensation. Goes on to discuss research on measuring IOS by using various proxies; and summarizes the main findings
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) increases restrictions on private litigation for securities fraud. We examine stock price reactions on legislative-event-related days of firms in four high-litigation-risk industries. Two other studies on this issue, Spiess and Tkac (1997) (ST) and Johnson et al. (2000) (JKN), conclude that shareholders considered PSLRA beneficial. While we find largely similar daily abnormal returns for event-related days that they examine, we present evidence that the timing of multiple confounding events makes the interpretation of these daily returns ambiguous. Results from additional analyses beyond those conducted by ST and JKN (market price reversal tests, analysis of additional legislative-event-related days, cumulative abnormal returns over the legislative period, and analysis of other events affecting investors' ability to bring securities-related lawsuits), are largely inconsistent with their interpretation, suggesting instead that shareholders in the four high-litigation-risk industries react negatively on average to PSLRA's restrictions on their ability to bring securities-related lawsuits.
Author(s): Ashiq Ali | Sanjay Kallapur
Empirical studies that examine the effects of regulation on cost containment frequently ignore the impact of changes in accounting practices. This results in a potential bias of research findings. For example, some studies found evidence of cost containment for inpatient services after a change in Medicare reimbursement in 1983. However, Eldenburg and Kallapur (1997, p. 33) found that more costs were allocated to outpatients and correspondingly less to inpatients after 1983, which could bias the cost comparisons. In this paper we examine changes in inpatient costs relative to outpatient costs, after controlling for allocations, to determine whether the magnitude of allocation changes was large enough to bias the findings of studies that ignored these accounting practices. As in previous health-care studies (noted in our paper), we found that inpatient full costs (i.e., direct cost plus allocated costs) decreased relative to outpatient full costs after 1983. However, when cost allocations were excluded, inpatient direct costs increased relative to outpatient direct costs, thus providing no evidence of cost-containment. When regulation provides incentives that have the potential to affect accounting practices and public policy researchers do not consider the implications of these accounting practices, analyses of the success of public regulation may reach improper conclusions. Accordingly, subsequent policy based on such research findings may be incorrectly motivated.
Realized growth can be viewed as a proxy for the unobservable investment opportunity set (IOS) of the firm, and provides a benchmark against which IOS proxy variables can be compared. Results from such a comparison indicate that many of the variables from earlier studies, including book-to-market measures and capital expenditure to assets ratios are consistently correlated with subsequently realized growth. However, R&D intensity and E/P ratios do not exhibit any consistent association with subsequent growth indicating that they may not be valid IOS proxies. Copyright Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1999.