By Aditya V. Kuvalekar, Antonio Romero-Medina
Review of Economic Design | February 2024
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10058-023-00348-4
Kuvalekar, A., Romero-Medina, A. (2024). A fair procedure in a marriage market. Review of Economic Design, 28, 533–550
Review of Economic Design, February 2024
We propose a new algorithm in the two-sided marriage market wherein both sides of the market propose in each round. The algorithm always yields a stable matching. Moreover, the outcome is a Rawlsian stable matching if the number of men and women is equal. Lastly, the algorithm can be computed in polynomial time and, from a practical standpoint, can be used in markets where fairness considerations are important.
Aditya Kuvalekar is a microeconomist whose primary research area is information economics. His research examines how changes in information environments shape individual and collective behavior, with applications ranging from protests and voting to interactions within organizations. A second strand of his work focuses on market design, including problems of land acquisition from groups and school choice when students have non-standard preferences. His research has been published in leading economics journals, including The American Economic Review, The RAND Journal of Economics, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, and Journal of Economic Theory.
