We propose that making a series of decreasing concessions (e.g., $1,500-1,210-1,180-1,170) signals that negotiators are reaching their limit and results in a negotiation disadvantage for recipients. We find that most negotiators do not use this strategy naturally. However, seven studies (N=2,311) demonstrate that decreasing concessions cause recipients to make less ambitious counteroffers (Studies 1-5) and reach worse deals (Study 2) in distributive negotiations. We find that this disadvantage occurs because decreasing concessions shape recipients’ expectations of the subsequent offers that will be made, which results in inflated perceptions of the counterparts’ reservation price relative to the other concession strategies (Study 3). We further show that this disadvantage is reduced when concessions decrease too slowly or too rapidly (Study 4a) and when the negotiation involves too few or too many rounds (Study 4b). Finally, this disadvantage is mitigated when recipients focus on their target price (Study 5).